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INFINITE LOTTERIES, SPINNERS, AND THE
APPLICABILITY OF HYPERREALS
EMANUELE BOTTAZZI AND MIKHAIL G. KATZ
Abstract. We analyze recent criticisms of the use of hyperreal
probabilities as expressed by Pruss, Easwaran, Parker, andWilliam-
son. We show that the alleged arbitrariness of hyperreal fields can
be avoided by working in the Kanovei–Shelah model or in saturated
models. We argue that some of the objections to hyperreal prob-
abilities arise from hidden biases that favor Archimedean models.
We discuss the advantage of the hyperreals over transferless fields
with infinitesimals. In [18] we analyze two underdetermination the-
orems by Pruss and show that they hinge upon parasitic external
hyperreal-valued measures, whereas internal hyperfinite measures
are not underdetermined.
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1. Introduction
Since Abraham Robinson introduced his framework for infinitesi-
mal analysis in the 1960s (see [68] and [69]), a sizeable literature
has developed in connection with the applicability of said infinitesi-
mal analysis in probability theory, physics, and other fields. Despite
the growing body of literature featuring such applications,1 the re-
cent years have seen a vigorous debate concerning the applicability of
Robinson’s framework in the sciences, with a number of advocates and
also a number of critics. The latter include Easwaran, Elga, Parker,
Pruss, Towsner, and Williamson. Recent additions to the literature are
Easwaran–Towsner ([28], 2018), Pruss ([65], 2018), and Parker ([62],
2019). Easwaran and Towsner call into question the applicability of
Robinson’s framework to the description of physical phenomena. A
rebuttal appears in Bottazzi et al. ([17], 2019). The present article
focuses mainly on the critiques as formulated by Parker, Pruss, and
Williamson. These authors have questioned the applicability of hyper-
real models in probability.
In the present text and in the sequel article [18], we analyze a claim
by Alexander Pruss (AP) that hyperreal models are underdetermined,
in the sense that, given a model, allegedly “there is no rational reason to
choose a particular infinitesimal member of an extension to be a value
for the probability” ([65, Section 3.1]) of a single event. To buttress his
claim, AP exhibits measures assigning a different infinitesimal value to
the event. We argue, however, that all of AP’s additional measures
are parasitic in the sense of Clendinnen [21].2 More specifically, AP
ignores a key property of entities such as functions and measures in
Robinson’s framework, namely the property of being internal. The
importance of internality stems from the fact that Robinson’s transfer
principle only applies to internal entities. Meanwhile, we prove that all
1Applications to physics (Albeverio et al. ([1], 1986), Faris ([31], 2006), Van den
Berg and Neves ([81], 2007), Loeb and Wolff ([57], 2015)), to probability theory
(Nelson [61], 1987), to stochastic analysis (Capin´ski and Cutland [20], 1995), to
canards (Diener and Diener [24], 1995), to mathematical economics and theoretical
ecology (Campillo and Lobry [19], 2012), to error analysis (Dinis and van den Berg
[25], 2019), to Markov processes (Duanmu et al. [26], 2021).
2Clendinnen points out the possibility that “All members of any set of empirically
equivalent but logically distinct theories might be parasitic on one key theory. That
is each of the other members of the set might only be able to be formulated by
utilizing the formulation of the key theory. If this situation obtained, [differential
underdetermination] would not hold; for the predictions which could be made by
using any one of the set of theories would nevertheless require the selection of the
single key theory. So the making of these predictions would depend on the selection
of a unique theory” [21, p. 76].
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of AP’s additional measures are external.3 Thus, if one considers only
internal hyperfinite measures, no underdetermination occurs.
AP also claims that certain transferless ordered fields properly ex-
tending the reals, such as the Levi-Civita field or the surreal numbers,
may have advantages over hyperreal fields in probabilistic modeling.
However, we show in [18] that probabilities developed over such fields
are less expressive than real-valued probabilities, and inferior to prob-
abilities developed over hyperreal fields.
In more detail, AP ([65], 2018) attacks Robinson’s framework for
mathematics with infinitesimals, claiming that its applications in prob-
ability cannot have any physical meaning. AP’s critique is more sophis-
ticated than that of Easwaran–Towsner, in that he acknowledges at the
outset that some commonly voiced objections to hyperreal numbers are
unconvincing.4 Nevertheless, AP claims that hyperreal probabilities are
underdetermined, namely that there is no rational reason to assign a
particular infinitesimal probability to non-empty events that classically
have probability zero. His argument hinges upon the following:
• examples of uniform processes that allegedly do not allow for a
uniquely defined infinitesimal probability for singletons, and
• a pair of theorems asserting that for every hyperreal-valued
probability measure5 there exist uncountably many others that
induce the same decision-theoretic preferences.
We will argue that the underdetermination claim is baseless, by ad-
dressing each of these critiques. The first critique is addressed in Sec-
tion 2 of the present article, whereas his pair of theorems are analyzed
in detail in the sequel article [18].
We note that the underdetermination attack is different from a pre-
vious attack against hyperreal probabilities developed by AP in ([64],
2014). In that paper, AP sought to argue that infinitesimals are
“too small” to give plausible probabilities of individual
outcomes in a countably infinite lottery.6 [64, p. 1052]
The 2014 attack was countered by Benci et al. ([12], 2018, Section 4.5,
pp. 531–534). The more recent Prussian charge is unrelated to the
3For a discussion of the notions of internal and external entities see Section 3.1.
4See Sections 2.1 and 2.2 for technical details.
5Throughout the paper probability measures are assumed to be finitely additive.
Notice that finitely additive probability measures include also σ-additive probabil-
ity measures, but some infinite sample spaces admit finitely additive probability
measures that are not σ-additive.
6Ironically, Reeder has criticized hyperreal infinitesimals for allegedly being too big
in ([67], 2017). Reeder’s claim is refuted by Bottazzi ([15], 2019).
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“smallness” argument of [64]. Instead, AP argues that it is impossible
uniquely to assign an infinitesimal as the probability of an event. A
similarity between [64] and [65] is that in both texts AP fails to take into
account the crucial distinction between internal and external sets and
functions in Robinson’s framework. Meanwhile, the analysis in Benci
et al. [12] is insufficient to address the underdetermination claim.
AP asserts that such underdetermination is a feature of infinitesimal
probabilities generally, but his examples and theorems mainly focus
on hyperreal-valued probability functions. Moreover, he suggests that
other non-Archimedean extensions of the real field could be more suit-
able for the development of infinitesimal probabilities. Significantly, he
makes no attempt to present a model of his uniform processes in such
alternative frameworks with infinitesimals. We will address AP’s claim
in Section 3 and in [18, Section 4].
In Section 2.2 we point out some common hidden assumptions in
mathematical modeling of physical phenomena, and analyze some com-
mon biases against Robinson’s framework. Such biases include the fol-
lowing: the insistence on the use of the natural numbers as the only
possible model for the time scale of processes that “go on for the rest
of time” (Section 2.3) and the claim that uncountably many hypernat-
ural numbers are not suitable for the representation of such discrete
processes (Section 2.4).
In Section 3 we highlight the significance of the transfer principle
of Robinson’s framework. AP suggests that measures taking values
in non-Archimedean fields other than hyperreal fields may be more
suitable for the development of infinitesimal probabilities. We show
that this suggestion overlooks the significance of the transfer principle.
A common flaw of criticisms of infinitesimal models, as pursued by
opponents of Robinson’s framework, is the assumption that certain
properties of the Archimedean accounts for infinite processes must also
be satisfied by every non-Archimedean probability that represents it.
However this assumption is unjustifiable; see [18, Section 2]. Moreover,
in [18] we show that there are appropriate hyperfinite representations
of the process that are not underdetermined.
The issues with the article by AP could be classified along the fol-
lowing lines:
(P1) (philosophical) (a) AP naively assumes that hyperreal mod-
els must mimick the properties of Archimedean ones; see Sec-
tions 2.3, 2.4, and [18, Section 2]. (b) AP fails to establish the
relevance of the parasitic external measures he introduces to
buttress his underdetermination charge; see [18], Section 3.4.
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(P2) (historical) AP ignores the Klein–Fraenkel criteria for the utility
of a theory of infinitesimals; see Section 3.3.
(P3) (consistency) While at the outset AP admits that the arbitrari-
ness claim against the hyperreals is mathematically incoherent,
he lapses into it later in his article; see Section 3.4.
(P4) (mathematical) AP makes inappropriate choices in hyperreal
modeling. Adopting more appropriate choices dissolves AP’s
argument against hyperreal modeling; see [18, Section 2.4].
In the present article we address items (P1), (P2), and (P3), whereas
in [18] we address items (P1) and (P4).
2. On mathematical representation of physical processes
AP opens his analysis by articulating some “intuitions” based on sce-
narios that can be represented by both Archimedean and non-Archime-
dean probability measures (before going on to discuss his underdetermi-
nation theorems that we will analyze in [18, Section 3]). Such scenarios
can be grouped into the following categories:
• some infinite processes, such as coin tosses7 [65, Sections 3.2
and 4.2], or the estimate of the value of a utility one can have
“every day for eternity” [65, Section 3.5];
• a pair of uniform processes over a single sample space, exem-
plified by the motion of two spinners (rotating pointers) [65,
Sections 3.2 and 3.3] and by a pair of uniform lotteries over N
[65, Section 4.1].
We will discuss the details of AP’s representation of the two spin-
ners in [18, Section 2]. Here we will comment more generally on the
issue of mathematical representation of physical processes. We argue
that certain physical processes may admit distinct mathematical mod-
els. For such processes, there does not exist a unique, well-defined
model that would represent them in a way resembling anything like an
isomorphism. Such a perspective is accepted even by mathematicians
and philosophers who adopt a responsible variety of mathematical re-
alism, as discussed in Section 2.3 (see also Bottazzi et al. [17], 2019,
Section 1). We further argue that hyperreal models can be used on par
7The example of an infinite collection of coin tosses has already been used to attack
hyperreal-valued probability measures by Williamson [83], Easwaran [27], Parker
[62] and other authors. Rebuttals of this argument can be found for instance
in Weintraub ([82], 2008), Bascelli et al. ([10], 2014), Hofweber ([42] 2014), and
Howson ([43], 2019).
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with Archimedean models based upon the Cantor–Dedekind represen-
tations of the continuum. This issue is also dealt with by Herzberg
([40], 2007, Section 4).
As acknowledged by AP, a common objection to the use of hyperreal
fields in such representations, namely that such fields are arbitrarily
specified, can be countered in several ways. Such an objection can be
countered either by working in the Kanovei–Shelah definable hyperreal
field [50] or by using suitable saturated hyperreal fields; see Section 2.1.
In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 we address further hidden assumptions in
Archimedean mathematical descriptions of the infinite processes rep-
resented by coin tosses from the aforementioned point of view that
rejects the postulation of a unique mathematical representation. In
particular, we argue that some commonly voiced objections to the use
of hyperreals in the representation of scenarios involving an infinity of
events stem from such hidden assumptions concerning mathematical
representation of physical events.
2.1. Are hyperreal fields arbitrary? AP acknowledges at the out-
set the failure of the commonly voiced objection of arbitrariness (and
even that of ineffability), namely that one cannot specify a particular
hyperreal extension of R (see Section 2.2 for details). Such an objection
was voiced by Alain Connes8 and others. The objection is specifically
refuted by the Kanovei–Shelah definable hyperreal field [50]; see also
[41]. For a rebuttal of the Bishop–Connes critique see Katz–Leichtnam
([51], 2013), Kanovei et al. ([48], 2015), and Sanders ([72], 2020).
Furthermore, AP acknowledges that the arbitrariness objection can
also be refuted by working with a hyperreal field defined up to an
isomorphism, and that for suitable cardinals κ, there is a unique-up-
to-isomorphism κ-saturated hyperreal field of cardinality κ.9 We will
source such “concessions” by AP in Section 2.2.
2.2. Pruss admits failure of arbitrariness/ineffability claims.
AP mentions a worry that
the choice of a hyperreal extension appears to be not
only arbitrary but ineffable . . . – we cannot success-
fully refer to a particular extension, and so a particular
extension cannot reflect our credences . . . [65, Section 1]
8See ([22], 2004, p. 14) where Connes describes Robinson’s framework as“some sort
of chimera.”
9More precisely, the condition is that an infinite cardinal κ should either be inac-
cessible or satisfy 2κ = κ+ (that is, the continuum hypothesis holds at κ). For
details see Keisler ([53], 1994, Section 11) and further references therein.
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However, he immediately acknowledges that “the ineffability argument
does not apply to all extensions of the reals, and even as restricted to
the hyperreals it is unsuccessful” (ibid.; emphasis added).
Thus AP acknowledges at the outset that the commonly voiced ob-
jection of arbitrariness (and even that of ineffability), namely the claim
that one cannot specify a particular hyperreal extension of R, is un-
successful, and specifically refuted by the Kanovei–Shelah definable
hyperreal field (see [50], [41]):
[B]y leveraging the idea that even when it is difficult
to specify a particular ultrafilter, one can specify sets
of ultrafilters, Kanovei and Shelah (2004) explicitly de-
fined a particular free ultrafilter on a particular infinite
set10 . . . Furthermore, Kanovei and Shelah used their
construction to make an explicitly specified extension of
the reals (an iteration of the hyperreal extension using
this ultrafilter) having further desirable properties. [65,
Section 2]
Moreover, AP acknowledges that the arbitrariness objection can also be
refuted by working with a hyperreal field defined up to an isomorphism:
[W]e can specify a set of hyperreals up to isomorphism.
For some cardinals κ, there is a unique-up-to-isomor-
phism κ-saturated non-standard real line of cardinal-
ity κ . . . And there might be some non-arbitrary way
to choose the cardinal κ, perhaps a way matching the
particular problem under discussion. [65, Section 2]
2.3. Shift-invariance hypothesis. Various scenarios involving infi-
nite processes have been discussed by AP and other authors, including
Easwaran, Parker, and Williamson. Such discussions often exhibit a
bias in favor of Archimedean models, which feature
• a countable infinity of events, and
• events that are ordered in time (rather than simultaneous).
A typical process that is modeled with such hidden assumptions
is the outcome of an infinite amount of coin tosses. A number of
arguments against hyperreal probabilities for infinite coin tosses hinge
upon the events H(n) that AP defines as follows:
10This characterisation by AP of the Kanovei–Shelah technique contains a mathe-
matical inaccuracy. The technique does not exploit an ultrafilter on an infinite set.
Rather, it exploits a maximal filter in a particular algebra of subsets of a certain
infinite set (the algebra in question does not contain all subsets!).
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starting with day n, it’s all heads for the rest of time.
[65, Section 3.2]
AP models such a process by a sequence of tosses labeled by N, and
makes the following assumption:
Shift-invariance hypothesis: Events H(n) andH(m)
are isomorphic for all m,n ∈ N
(the term shift-invariance hypothesis is ours). Meanwhile, alternative
models of these infinite processes can be obtained with hyperfinite tech-
niques, as discussed for instance by Benci et al. [11, pp. 44–46]; see also
Nelson ([61], 1987) and Albeverio et al. ([1], 1986). These models show
that the shift-invariance hypothesis is spurious, since it does not hold
in a hyperfinite representation of the infinite collection of coin tosses.11
The shift-invariance hypothesis is often justified by an appeal to the
“physical structure” of the infinite process. Thus, Williamson writes:
“A fair coin will be tossed infinitely many times at one second intervals”
in ([83], 2007) on page 174. By the middle of page 175, he is ready to
claim an ability to
map the constituent single-toss events of H(1 . . .) one-
one onto the constituent single-toss events of H(2 . . .)
in a natural way that preserves the physical structure of
the set-up just by mapping each toss to its successor.
(ibid., p. 175; emphasis added)
Williamson appears to be taking for granted a “physical structure”
possessing a considerable supply of physical seconds.
The same assumption appears in the more recent text by Parker
([62], 2019). Parker implicitly assumes that a countable sequence of
coin tosses is physically feasible, and bases his Isomorphism Principle
[62, p. 4] on such an assumption.
Bascelli et al. ([10], 2014) analyzed similar biases in favor of modeling
based upon a countable infinity of time-ordered events in Easwaran
([27], 2014). Namely, an assumption of a countable time-ordered model
already involves a full-fledged idealisation lacking a referent.
What Williamson and Parker fail to recognize is that, even from the
viewpoint of a responsible variety of mathematical realism, a mathe-
matical description of a physical event typically involves some level of
idealisation and introduces some spurious properties (as already argued
11Howson argued that the events H(n) and H(m) are not equiprobable when-
ever n 6= m even in the Archimedean model where the sample space is the σ-algebra
generated by the cylinder sets in {0, 1}N ([43], 2019, Section 3). A similar observa-
tion was made by Benci et al. [12, pp. 21–22]. Both arguments have been addressed
by Parker [62].
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for instance in [17, Section 1]). As a consequence of such idealisation,
it is not possible to claim that a physical process has a unique well-
defined sample space, or that one particular sample space provides the
only correct mathematical description of a physical process. For more
details, we refer to [17, Section 1.4] and to references therein.
In the coinflip case, it is obvious that it is physically impossible to flip
a coin, as Parker would have it, “infinitely many times, at times t0 +n
seconds for n = 0, 1, 2, . . .” [62, p. 8]. Nevertheless, it is possible to
model this situation as a sequence of coin tosses over N, or with other
notions of number, as already mentioned.
Furthermore, starting with a physical intuition of something going on
“for the rest of time,” there are several possibilities of formalizing such
an intuition mathematically. One way is to interpret time increments
as ranging over the traditional N. An alternative way of modeling such
an intuition would be to postulate that the “time” in question comes
to an end rather than goes on indefinitely, given the likelihood of phys-
ical armageddon expected by some modern theories in astrophysics. If
so, then finite and hyperfinite modeling, which postulate such a final
moment, are arguably more faithful to physical intuition than model-
ing by N. In this sense, an assumption that an intuition of “for the
rest of time” necessarily refers to N, involves circular reasoning, as the
conclusion is built into the premise. Attempting to base “intuitive rea-
sons” against infinitesimal probabilities on such an idealized model, as
AP does in [65, Section 3.2], begs the question as to why one assumes
precisely such a model rather than, say, a hyperfinite number of simul-
taneous coin flips.12 Indeed, the model chosen by Easwaran, Parker,
Pruss, and Williamson predetermines the outcome of their analyses.
The shift-invariance hypothesis is analyzed further in Section 2.5.
2.4. Cardinality objection. AP puts forth the following objection
to the use of hypernatural numbers:
[I]t turns out that for any positive infinite number M
in ∗R, if ∗R has a collection of hypernaturals, then there
will be uncountably many (in external cardinality)13 hy-
pernaturals between 1 and M (Pruss 2014, Appendix).
12Or finite nonstandard number of flips in Nelson’s framework; see Section 3.2.
13AP’s parenthetical comment referring to external cardinality indicates that he is
aware of the distinction between internal and external entities (in this case, car-
dinality). Six years prior to the online publication of [65], he referred to internal
cardinality in his posting [63]. However, AP tails to take into account the distinc-
tion between internal and external hyperreal probabilities, as we will show in [18],
Section 2.5.
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And so the countable number of future days that we’ve
imagined is not what is counted by M : instead, M
counts the number of members of the uncountable set
{1, 2, . . . ,M} of hypernaturals. (Pruss [65], 2018, Sec-
tion 3.5)
What AP is claiming is that if one is interested in countably many
“future days” (i.e., trials), hypernaturals do not provide an accurate
model by cardinality considerations. However, his cardinality objection
is not valid, for the following reason. Skolem [80] already developed
elementary (in the sense of PA) extensions NSk of N in the 1930s.
Skolem’s precedent was clearly acknowledged by Robinson ([69], 1966,
pp. vii, 88, 278), who noted that “Skolem’s method foreshadows the ul-
trapower construction” (op. cit., p. 88). Being built out of equivalence
classes of (definable) sequences of natural numbers, NSk naturally em-
beds in ∗R (for details see Kanovei et al. [49], 2013). If one’s interest is
in countable structures only, one can proceed as follows:
(1) construct a countable extension NSk of N following Skolem;
(2) form the field of fractions F of NSk;
(3) F is then an ordered field properly including Q.
In particular, there will be only countably many numbers in such an ex-
tension F , and hence countably many numbers in the set {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
An identical rebuttal applies to AP’s rejection of a nonstandard solu-
tion to the paradox of Thomson’s lamp in ([66], 2018, p. 41).
2.5. Standard model of the naturals and coinflipping. In this
section we will examine the relation of the so-called standard model
of arithmetic to modeling infinite processes such as infinite lotteries,
coin flips, etc. It is possible to disassociate the issue of scientific mod-
eling (in physics, probability, etc.) from the issue of putative existence
of a standard model (a.k.a. the intended interpretation) of N. Even
modulo such an N along the Cantor–Dedekind lines (not along the
Nelson lines), one can question the Pruss–Williamson (PW) assump-
tion that N can be embedded in physical time. PW make no effort to
justify the assumption, which is surprising for publications in venues
such as Analysis and Synthese.
In the following, we adopt the analysis of Kuhlemann ([55], 2018).
When PW speak of performing a trial every second (or day) from now
to eternity and of the “physical structure” of the process, they may
be referring to either metalanguage natural numbers or the object lan-
guage natural numbers.
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Logicians make a distinction between, on the one hand, metalan-
guage naturals, and, on the other, the object language naturals (e.g.,
numbers in the putative standard model a.k.a. intended interpreta-
tion). Thus, Simpson denotes metanaturals by ω to distinguish them
from N [79, pp. 9–10]. At best, metanaturals can be related to as a
sorites-type subcollection (of the object language naturals N) which
does not exist as a set, blocking implementation of a set of trials in-
dexed by metanaturals (see [25, p. 255] for a related model of the sorites
paradox).
If PW mean to refer to metanaturals, the analysis above would un-
dermine the shift-invariance hypothesis (see Section 2.3) and the PW
attempt to identify H(1) with H(2) “naturally”.14
If, on the other hand, PW are referring to the object language nat-
urals, then they are already making an assumption favoring one type
of idealisation over another, so that their conclusion is built into their
premise. N is not naturally built into intuitions and thought experi-
ments involving lotteries and coinflips (though it may be built into the
type of undergraduate mathematical training that PW received).
3. On the strength of theories with infinitesimals
We will define the notions of internal and external objects in Sec-
tion 3.1, and present the transfer principle of Robinson’s framework in
Section 3.2. These notions play a major role in mathematical model-
ing with hyperreal numbers. The significance of the transfer principle
is also related to the historical development of mathematical theories
with infinitesimals, as discussed in Section 3.3. Thus these notions will
be central to our discussion of the infinitesimal models of the uniform
processes proposed by AP (see [18], Section 2), and of AP’s pair of
theorems (see [18], Section 3).
We will also evaluate AP’s claim that transferless non-Archimedean
extensions of the real numbers might be more suitable for the devel-
opment of infinitesimal probabilities. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we will
elaborate on some consequences of the absence of transfer in the surreal
numbers and the Levi-Civita field. What this entails for their applica-
bility or otherwise to probability theory is discussed in detail in [18],
Section 4.
14Williamson actually uses the term natural in reference to applying the shift to
physical processes. AP actually speaks of “[t]he countable number of future days”
[65, Section 3.5].
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3.1. Constructing hyperreal fields. It is well known that fields ∗R
of hyperreal numbers can be obtained by the so-called ultrapower con-
struction. In this approach, one sets ∗R = RN/U , where U is a nonprin-
cipal ultrafilter over N. The operations and relations on ∗R are defined
from the quotient structure. For instance, given x = [xn] and y = [yn],
we set x+ y = [xn+ yn] and x · y = [xn · yn]. We have x < y if and only
if {n ∈ N : xn < yn} ∈ U .
Let P = P(R) be the power set of R. Then the star transform
produces the object ∗P. An internal subset A ⊆ ∗R of ∗R is by defini-
tion a member of ∗P. More concretely, in the ultrapower construction
an internal subset A ⊆ ∗R is represented by a sequence (An) of sub-
sets An ⊆ R. Here an element [xn] ∈
∗R belongs to A = [An] if and
only if {n ∈ N : xn ∈ An} ∈ U . A subset of
∗R which is not internal is
called external.
More generally, in the context of the star transform from the super-
structure over R to the superstructure over ∗R, a set A of the latter is
internal if and only if it is a member of ∗Z for some Z in the super-
structure over R. For further properties of the ultrapower construction
of hyperreal numbers and the superstructures, see Fletcher et al. ([32],
2017) and Goldblatt ([36], 1998).
3.2. The transfer principle of Robinson’s framework. Kanovei
et al. describe the transfer principle of Robinson’s framework as
a type of theorem that, depending on the context, as-
serts that rules, laws or procedures valid for a certain
number system, still apply (i.e., are “transferred”) to an
extended number system. ([47], 2018, p. 113)
The transfer principle asserts that the internal objects of Robinson’s
framework satisfy all the first-order properties of the corresponding
classical objects.
The simplest examples of transfer involve the extension of sets and
functions via the ∗ map. For instance, a continuous function f : R→ R
is a function that satisfies the formula
∀x0 ∈ R ∀ε ∈ R, ε > 0 ∃δ ∈ R, δ > 0
∀x ∈ R (|x− x0| < δ → |f(x)− f(x0)| < ε) .
The function f is extended to a function ∗f : ∗R→ ∗R that satisfies
∀x0 ∈
∗R ∀ε ∈ ∗R, ε > 0 ∃δ ∈ ∗R, δ > 0
∀x ∈ ∗R (|x− x0| < δ → |
∗f(x)− ∗f(x0)| < ε)
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(an internal function satisfying this formula is sometimes called ∗conti-
nuous). Moreover, ∗f satisfies the Intermediate Value Theorem, the
Mean Value Theorem, and every other first-order property of f .
We now turn to properties of sets under extension. For instance, the
Archimedean property of R is expressed by the formula
(3.1) ∀x, y ∈ R
(
(0 < x ∧ x < y)→ ∃n ∈ N (y < nx)
)
.
An application of the transfer principle to the above formula yields
(3.2) ∀x, y ∈ ∗R
(
(0 < x ∧ x < y)→ ∃n ∈ ∗N (y < nx)
)
.
The latter formula needs to be distinguished from the former, since,
as is well known, a ring extension of R with infinitesimal elements is
non-Archimedean.15
The first-order properties are preserved also by certain sets and func-
tions that are not of the form ∗X for some classical X . A relevant
example is given by a hyperfinite set, i.e., a set that can be put in an
(internal) one-to-one correspondence with a set of hypernatural num-
bers of the form {x ∈ ∗N : x ≤ H}. Hyperfinite sets being internal,
the transfer principle ensures that hyperfinite sets have the same first-
order properties as finite sets. As a consequence, hyperfinite sets can
be routinely applied to a wide variety of problems. For a discussion of
selected applications, we refer to Arkeryd et al. ([2], 1997).
Katz–Sherry ([52], 2013) suggest that the transfer principle can be
interpreted as a formalisation of the law of continuity of Leibniz; see
also Sherry–Katz ([78], 2014). Such a connection was first mentioned by
Robinson ([69], 1966, p. 266). Robinson’s historical chapter 10 has oc-
casioned a reappraisal of the legacy in infinitesimal analysis of pioneers
like Fermat [8], Gregory [9], Leibniz [3], Euler [4], and Cauchy [5], [6].
We emphasize that the transfer principle applies only to internal
entities of Robinson’s framework. Note that external entities do not
exist in Nelson’s framework Internal Set Theory [60].16 For this reason,
attempted arguments from first principles that do not take into account
Nelson’s framework are not actually based on first principles as they are
15The fundamental difference between the two formulas is that, in (3.2), the vari-
able n can take infinite hypernatural values.
16In Nelson’s framework, set theory is enriched by a one-place predicate st. The
formula st(x) asserts that an entity x is standard. The ZFC axioms are enriched
by the addition of further axioms governing the interaction of the new predicate
with the axioms of traditional set theory. Infinitesimals, say ǫ, are found within
the ordinary real line, and satisfy 0 < |ǫ| < r for all standard x ∈ R+. It is shown
in [60] that the new theory is conservative with respect to ZFC. A related system
was developed independently by Hrbacek [44]. For further details, see Fletcher et
al. ([32], 2017) and Hrbacek–Katz ([45], 2020).
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claimed to be, but rather involve an unspoken commitment to a specific
set-theoretic framework (for instance, Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory plus
the Axiom of Choice) expressed in the ∈-language. This is done at the
expense of other possible foundational frameworks.17 Thus, from the
point of view of Internal Set Theory, internal probability measures are
no less underdetermined than the traditional ones.
3.3. Usefulness of infinitesimals: Klein and Fraenkel. During
the opening decades of the 20th century, both Felix Klein18 ([54], 1908)
and Abraham Fraenkel ([35], 1928) formulated a pair of criteria to
gauge the success of theories with infinitesimals. These criteria are
(1) the availability and provability (by infinitesimal techniques) of
the Mean Value Theorem, and
(2) the introduction of the definite integral in terms of infinitesimal
increments.
For a detailed discussion, see Kanovei et al. ([47], 2018). Klein and
Fraenkel both observed that the infinitesimal theories available at the
time (including the Levi-Civita field) did not enable a satisfactory treat-
ment of these topics. When Robinson introduced his framework for
analysis with infinitesimals, Fraenkel related to Robinson’s framework
as an important accomplishment that finally solved the old problem
of developing a usable non-Archimedean field. Thanks to the trans-
fer principle, in Robinson’s framework it is possible to prove the Mean
Value Theorem (MVT) and to define the Riemann integral of a continu-
ous function by means of hyperfinite summation of infinitesimal terms.
Notice that the MVT and the definition of an integral, and in gen-
eral the development of a calculus on non-Archimedean structures that
extends the real calculus, require an extension of real functions. Costin
et al. observe that
A longstanding aim has been to develop analysis on [the
surreal numbers] as a powerful extension of ordinary
analysis on the reals. This entails finding a natural way
of extending important functions f from the reals to the
reals to functions f ∗ from the surreals to the surreals,
and naturally defining integration on the f ∗. [23, Ab-
stract]
17More specifically, the unspoken commitment typically involved is to a set theory
in the ∈-language rather than a set theory in the ∈-st-language; see note 16.
18In recent decades, there has been a deplorable attempt by Mehrtens ([58], 1990),
Gray ([38], 2008), and others to discredit Klein both mathematically and politically.
A rebuttal appears in Bair et al. ([7], 2017).
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In Robinson’s framework, such an extension is provided by the ∗ map.
Meanwhile, it is still an open problem to define well-behaved extensions
of real functions to the surreals or to the Levi-Civita field. For the sur-
real numbers, the problem is caused by the necessity to define functions
from the simplicity hierarchical structure of the surreal number tree.19
Meanwhile, every real continuous function admits a canonical exten-
sion to a continuous function on the Levi-Civita field. However, this
extension does not preserve many properties of the original real con-
tinuous functions, such as an Intermediate Value Theorem or a Mean
Value Theorem.20
Moreover, the surreal field and the Levi-Civita field satisfy only some
restricted versions of the Klein–Fraenkel criteria. Namely, in the sur-
real numbers it is not possible to prove the MVT, and it is still an open
problem to define an integral (see for instance Costin et al. [23] and For-
nasiero [34]). Meanwhile, for the Levi-Civita field, Shamseddine showed
that the MVT is valid only for analytic functions [73]. Consequently,
this theorem fails for instance for the extension of non-analytic real
continuous functions. The Levi-Civita field does have a notion of inte-
gral in dimensions 1, 2 and 3, but the integral is not defined in terms of
sums of infinitesimal contributions; see Berz–Shamseddine ([13], 2003),
Shamseddine ([75], 2012), Shamseddine–Flynn ([77], 2018). In addi-
tion, it turns out that the extensions of continuous but non-analytic
real functions are not measurable21 (Bottazzi [16]).
When Klein and Fraenkel formulated their criteria for the evalua-
tion of non-Archimedean extensions of the reals (see [47]), a number
of such non-Archimedean options were available, including the Levi-
Civita field. It is those ordered fields that Klein and Fraenkel were
referring to when they expressed disappointment with the (then) cur-
rent rate of progress, when even the Mean Value Theorem was not
yet provable using infinitesimal analysis. AP’s critique of Robinson’s
framework fails to take into account the fact that at present, Robin-
son’s is the only theory of infinitesimals that meets the Klein–Fraenkel
19For instance, no surreal extension of the sine function usable in ordinary math-
ematics is as yet available; see e.g., Kanovei’s remark at https://mathoverflow.
net/a/307114
20In this context, Bottazzi suggested an analogy between these extensions and ex-
ternal functions of Robinson’s framework [14].
21Recall that every real continuous function is Lebesgue-measurable and, if it is
defined over a closed interval, it also has a well-defined Riemann integral. The fail-
ure of measurability for the extensions of non-analytic real functions is a significant
limitation for the measure theory on the Levi-Civita field and it is also a blatant
failure of transfer for this field.
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criteria of utility. These criteria are prerequisites for a measure or
probability theory.
3.4. Infinitesimals without transfer. The importance of the trans-
fer principle in non-Archimedean extensions of the real numbers can
be better appreciated if one considers what happens when this princi-
ple is not available. We will refer to such non-Archimedean fields as
transferless.
Thus, in Henle’s non-nonstandard analysis [39] what is available is
a weak form of transfer that applies only to equations, inequalities and
their conjunctions, but not to their disjunction. As a consequence,
some properties of ordered fields fail, and Henle’s extension is only a
partially ordered ring with zero divisors.22
Similarly, in the Levi-Civita field the absence of a transfer principle
makes it necessary to prove individually many theorems of the cal-
culus, such as the Intermediate Value Theorem and the Mean Value
Theorem for analytic functions. For a more detailed discussion, see
Shamseddine–Berz ([76], 2010) and Shamseddine ([73], 2011). In ad-
dition, currently it is possible to extend only analytic real functions to
the Levi-Civita field in a way that preserves their first-order properties,
as shown by Bottazzi ([14], 2018).
In other transferless fields the situation might be even more difficult;
we are not aware of any research towards establishing some (even lim-
ited) forms of transfer in such settings. Nevertheless, AP suggests that
there are “multiple methods” of developing infinitesimal probabilities
in transferless fields:
[H]yperreals are not the only way to get infinitesimals.
There are multiple methods that do not make use of
anything like the arbitrary choice of an ultrafilter.23 [65,
Section 2]
AP argues that, as a consequence,
The friend of infinitesimal probabilities has a real hope
of non-arbitrarily specifying a particular field of infinites-
imals. (ibid.)
22In some cases, working with number systems lacking the habitual properties can
lead the author into error. Thus, Laugwitz pointed out that Henle’s article lapses
into using denominators when working with a ring. Laugwitz goes on to invite the
reader to “rewrite the relevant passages” [56].
23Here AP seems to lapse into the arbitrariness charge against Robinson’s frame-
work discussed in Section 2.1. Notice that this passage comes after AP’s admission
that it is possible to uniquely specify some particular hyperreal fields.
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Moreover, he claims that certain transferless fields, namely the surreal
numbers, fields of Laurent series or the Levi-Civita field, have some
advantages over hyperreal fields. Thus AP writes:
[T]he surreals have the advantage of being exhaustively
large, large enough that they escape the cardinality ar-
guments against regularity of Pruss (2013a). The fields
of formal Laurent series and the Levi-Civita field, on
the other hand, have the advantage of being elegantly
small. (On the other hand, the Kanovei–Shelah field,
while mathematically fascinating, probably has little go-
ing for it in this context.)24 [65, Section 2]
It can be argued that the main advantage of the field of Laurent series
and the Levi-Civita field is that of being definable from the natural
numbers in a choice-free manner. If one works in the von Neumann–
Bernays–Go¨del set theory with global choice, then the surreal numbers
are also uniquely specified. It is also true that many hyperreal fields
obtained as ultrapowers of R are not definable in a choice-free manner;
however, as AP acknowledges, suitable κ-saturated fields of hyperreal
numbers are uniquely specified up to an isomorphism.25
However, the issue at hand is not whether a non-Archimedean field
is definable from the natural numbers without additional parameters.
The real issue is the applicability of such a field. In this regard, the
Levi-Civita field has some limited applications in automatic derivation
[76] and in the description of physical phenomena [33], while there is a
vast literature of applications of hyperreal fields.26
That such applications are possible is due in particular to the transfer
principle of Robinson’s framework. Significantly, the principle is not
discussed by AP in [65].27 Instead, AP expresses enthusiasm about
the surreal numbers, Laurent series, and Levi-Civita fields, but fails to
explain their shortcoming, namely lack of transfer. Significantly, AP
does not develop a model either for the infinite coin tosses or for his
spinners in any of these transferless structures. Thus, his claim that
24AP’s parenthetical claim that the KS model has little advantage over the trans-
ferless fields mentioned is questionable, since the KS model can be used just as well
as any traditional RN/U model (see Section 3.1), particularly with the saturation
improvement provided by Kanovei–Shelah [50]. In particular, the KS model has
the advantage of the transfer principle.
25See Section 2.1.
26Some relevant examples can be found in note 1.
27It is a matter of public record that AP is aware of the transfer principle, since he
mentions it both in [65, Appendix] and in [66, p. 41].
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these non-Archimedean fields may be suitable for the development of
an infinitesimal probability is baseless.
Indeed, in [18, Section 4] we argue that attempts to develop infini-
tesimal probabilities over the surreal numbers or over the Levi-Civita
field encounter a number of difficulties.
For instance, in order to accomplish anything with the surreals one
would have first to import the transfer principle via an identification of
maximal class-size surreals with maximal class-size hyperreals, as men-
tioned by Ehrlich [30, Theorem 20]. Without such an identification and
without the transfer principle of Robinson’s framework, it is currently
not possible to develop a measure theory on the surreal numbers (for
more details, see [18, Section 4.1]).28
The Levi-Civita field does obey a type of transfer principle, albeit
limited to a particular extension of real analytic functions; see Bottazzi
([14], 2018).
One could also work directly with the measure-theoretic tools avail-
able in the various theories to define non-Archimedean probability mea-
sures; however, there seem to be some difficulties.
Consider for instance the case of the Levi-Civita field, where a uni-
form measure is currently under development by Shamseddine and Berz
[13], Shamseddine [75], Shamseddine and Flynn [77] and Bottazzi [16].
So far this uniform measure is not able to accommodate more than
locally analytic probability functions, and has no notion of hyperfinite-
ness comparable to that of Robinson’s framework. This example is
discussed further in [18], Section 4.2.
4. Conclusion
We have examined some commonly voiced objections to the use of hy-
perreal numbers in mathematical modeling. Many of these objections
are based upon naive assumptions regarding the possibility of uniquely
specifying some hyperreal fields, and upon examples of infinite pro-
cesses that allegedly do not allow for a uniquely defined infinitesimal
probability for singletons.
The first objection, namely that it is allegedly not possible to spec-
ify a hyperreal field in a unique way, is refuted by the Kanovei–Shelah
definable hyperreal field and by the fact that, for suitable infinite car-
dinals κ, there is a unique-up-to-isomorphism κ-saturated hyperreal
28It should be noted that the omnific surnaturals do not satisfy the axioms of Peano
Arithmetic; e.g., there exist surnaturals p, q such that p2 = 2q2. For further details
see [59], [71], [46].
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field of cardinality κ. Note that this rebuttal is accepted also by some
detractors of Robinson’s framework for analysis with infinitesimals.
With regard to objections based upon the analysis of certain infi-
nite processes, we have observed that physical processes often admit
distinct mathematical models, so that there does not exist a unique,
well-defined model that would represent them in a way resembling
anything like an isomorphism. Thus we have shown that, for some
commonly used models e.g., of infinite coin tosses, some objections to
the use of Robinson’s framework stem from hidden and unnecessary
assumptions that predetermine the choice of an Archimedean model.
Dropping such hidden assumptions enables alternative models of these
infinite processes, obtained via hyperfinite techniques.
Moreover, we have started addressing the claim by Pruss that trans-
ferless extensions of the real numbers (such as the surreal field, the Levi-
Civita field, or the field of Laurent series) might be more suitable for
the development of infinitesimal probabilities. The proposal of work-
ing with such non-Archimedean fields ignores both the Klein–Fraenkel
criteria for gauging the applicability of theories with infinitesimals, and
the power and utility of the transfer principle. In [18] we show that,
due to these limitations, the measure theory on such transferless fields
is less expressive than the hyperfinite counting measures.
Pruss claims that “[w]hatever you can do with hyperreals, you can
do with surreals” and that “[t]he fields of formal Laurent series and the
Levi–Civita field . . . have the advantage of being elegantly small” [65].
However, in [18] we will see that, by his own Theorem 1, these fields suf-
fer from underdetermination due to the possibility of rescaling the infin-
itesimal part of the probability, and do not possess a notion of internal-
ity that enables one to escape such underdetermination in Robinson’s
framework. Prussian Theorem 1, when properly analyzed, boomerangs
to undercut his own underdetermination thesis. Prussian Theorem 2
is similarly Boomerang 2 due to the existence of nontrivial automor-
phisms for all such transferless fields.29
Arguments based on the non-effectiveness of ultrafilters are not lim-
ited to the work of Pruss; see e.g., Easwaran–Towsner [28]. In spite of
an initial plausibility of such arguments against Robinson’s framework,
the arguments dissolve upon closer inspection, and even tend to prove
the opposite of what their authors intended. One can well wonder
29See Ehrlich ([29], 1994, pp. 253) for the existence of nontrivial automorphisms of
the surreals as an ordered field, and Shamseddine ([74], 2011, p. 224, Remark 3.17)
for such existence for all ordered extensions of R.
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why such arguments ad ultrafiltrum don’t succeed. A recent develop-
ment suggests a possible reason. It turns out that the main body of
the applicable part of Robinson’s framework admits a formalisation
that requires modest foundational means not exceeding those required
for traditional non-infinitesimal methods in ordinary mathematics; see
Hrbacek–Katz [45]. Thus the alleged non-effectiveness is simply not
there to begin with.
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